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Everything is Tottering
Why Philosophy of History Thrives in Times of Crisis herman paul
The philosophy of history is unlikely to disappear in a world beset by crises.
Crises, understood as anomalies in how people conceive of their past-present relationships, serve as impetuses rather than as obstacles to philosophy of history. The more societies wonder whether economic growth is endless, or whether children in the West will ever reach the prosperity levels of their parents or how growing burdens of public debt will affect the 'social contract between the generations', the more likely they are to rethink their inherited past-present relationships. In a sense then, philosophy is a crisis phenomenon: the genre thrives in times of uncertainty. This does not imply that philosophy of history will always be taught in academic history departments: the genre has often, not to say usually, been practiced by non-historians. Historians might want to consider though, how well they serve their societies if they allow the philosophy of history to be practiced without the critical checks and balances of professional historiography. everything is tottering: why philosophy of history thrives in times of crisis paul
Past-present relationships
There is, admittedly, no lack of counter examples. Henry Thomas Buckle, whose name in late Victorian England was almost synonymous with the philosophy of history, was more self-assured in tracing the laws of historical evolution. Similarly, when Albert Maria Weiss, a now forgotten Swiss philosopher, envied 'the few rarefied minds whom it has been given to make the most beautiful theme that a human pen can work on, a philosophy of history, the subject of their thought' 5 , he demonstrated that there have been thinkers, blessed with greater tranquillity than Vico, Droysen, and Troeltsch, for whom philosophy of history was not a tormented search for redefinition of problematic past-present relationships but a confirmation of the comforting illusion that history was on their side.
Nonetheless, in most cases, the philosophy of history has attracted scholarly attention because there was a broadly felt need for rethinking inherited past-present relationships (that is, inherited modes of studying, interpreting, representing or otherwise relating to the past). When in the midtwentieth century philosophers of history devoted one book after another to 'the meaning of history', they did so because the grand historical visions of Buckle and Weiss had been shattered into pieces, leaving societies to wonder in which direction, if any, history was heading. And in our day one of the most hotlydebated issues in philosophy of history is the perceived lack of meaning in what seems the negative defining moment of European identity -the Holocaust.
It is also no coincidence that Hayden White, whose work revolves around a desire to liberate human beings from oppressive traditions 6 , is nowadays most widely read in Eastern Europe, Latin America and China. A leading journal in the field, History and Theory, recently declared that these regions display a far greater interest in the philosophy of history than North America and Western Europe (so that the journal now finds itself cooperating with the Chinese Academy of Sciences instead of with the American Historical Association).
7
In short, it seems that philosophy of history thrives in times of crisis, or more precisely, in spatio-temporal contexts of uncertainty about the plausibility of inherited past-present relationships (i.e., inherited modes of making sense of the past). While there is often no perceived need for philosophy of history as long as conventional past-present relationships suffice, the genre attracts intense interest as soon as history changes from beautiful into sublime (that is, from an answer into a question, or from predictable into adventurous or threatening). 
A rich array of resources
Perhaps the most interesting question then, is not whether philosophy of history has a future (which it certainly has), but to what extent those professionally employed as philosophers of history will be able to respond to a societal demand for rethinking inherited past-present relationships. Especially in such countries as the Netherlands, where philosophy of history in the past half a century has been institutionalised in academic history programmes to a degree unheard of in the rest of the world, the most urgent question might be to what extent philosophers of history will be prepared to help societies reflect on, for example, grand historical narratives that are no longer deemed convincing.
As far as I can see, the successes of critical philosophy of history in the past sixty years both enable and hinder philosophers of history to assume this responsibility. On the one hand, critical philosophy of history has been so anxious to avoid everything vaguely resembling Marx, Hegel or Spengler that it has almost exclusively applied itself to the study of how historians (in the West) investigate the past. The catalogue of quasi-canonical problems in forum contemporary philosophy of history does not include the meaning of history or the dangers of historical relativism; it consists rather of such historians' problems as explanation, inference, intention, context, comparison and model-building. Indeed, increasingly philosophy of history has become a philosophy of professional historiography, that is, a 'philosophical metadisciplinary' subfield not unlike philosophy of science or philosophy of economics.
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While this narrow disciplinary focus might not seem particularly advantageous, the flip side is that decades of relative isolation have allowed philosophers of history to engage in fairly specialist debates over causation, 
